Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Diane Fish v. Jeffrey Fish : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Timothy W. Blackburn; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorney for Appellee.
Robert L. Neeley; Neeley & Neeley; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fish v. Fish, No. 20090916 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1993

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE FISH,
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

Appellate Case No.

20090916

JEFFREY J. FISH,

Civil No.

074901990DA

Respondent/Appellant.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Weber, State of Utah
Honorable Ernie W. Jones, District Court Judge

Timothy W. Blackburn
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorney for Appellee
372 24th Street, Suite 400
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 801-394-5783
Facsimile: 801-627-2522

Robert L. Neeley
NEELEY&NEELEY
Attorney for Appellant
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 801-621-3646
Facsimile: 801-621-3652

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE FISH,
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

Appellate Case No,

20090916

JEFFREY J. FISH,

Civil No.

074901990DA

Respondent/Appellant.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Weber, State of Utah
Honorable Ernie W. Jones, District Court Judge

Timothy W. Blackburn
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorney for Appellee
372 24th Street, Suite 400
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 801-394-5783
Facsimile: 801-627-2522

Robert L. Neeley
NEELEY&NEELEY
Attorney for Appellant
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 801-621-3646
Facsimile: 801-621-3652

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii, iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

7

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

15

ARGUMENT

.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPUTE FULL-TIME
EMPLOYMENT TO APPELLEE, DIANE FISH

19

19

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING FULL-TIME INCOME TO
JEFFERY FISH, CONSIDERING HE WAS ENGAGED IN CAREER OR
OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING AND FAILED TO SUPPORT IT WITH
SPECIFIC, DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT
IE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ESTABLISHING ALIMONY BY
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PARTIES' HISTORICAL INCOME
AND STANDARD OF LIVING

28

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING $30,000 TO $40,000
ANNUAL INCOME TO JEFFERY FISH AND FAILED TO SUPPORT
IT WITH SPECIFIC, DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT

32

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

37

ADDENDA

39

A.
B.
C.

Memorandum Decision
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Decree of Divorce

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES
Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)

4

Allredv.Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990)

2

Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App.1992)

21

Childsv. ChUds, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct.App. 1998)

2

Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App. 1994)

28

English v.English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)

3,28

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993)

26

Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)

2

Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983)

3

Jensen v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117, 120 (Utah App.2008)

30

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985)

3, 21, 22

Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f 26, 9 P.3d 171(Utah App.2000)

2

Mancil v. Smith, 18 P.3d 509, 512 (Utah App.200)

26

Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988)

21

Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985)

28

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)

4

Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank,613> P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)

4

Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008)

2, 30

Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)

4

Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986)

4

Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App.1988)
Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.1992)
Thronsonv. Thronson, 810 P.2d428, 435 (Utah App. 1991)
Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Utah 1977)
Wiley v. Willey, 951 P.2d226, 230 (Utah 1997)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3, 22
3
21
28
3, 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
STATUTES

PAGE

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(8)(a)

2, 5,20, 21,
22,30

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(8)(c) and (d)

3, 16, 31

Utah Code Annotated § 78B-12-203(7)

6, 16, 25,
26,27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE FISH,
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

Appellate Case No.

20090916

JEFFREY J. FISH,

Civil No.

074901990DA

Respondent/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78A-4-103(2)(h), appeals from the district court involving domestic relations including, but not
limited to, divorce.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in failing to impute full-time employment to Appellee, Diane Fish?
Standard of Review. Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards so long
as they consider at least the following factors:
(i)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii)

the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

(iii)

the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv)

the length of the marriage;

(v)

whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children requiring support;

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(vi)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and

(vii)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(vii) (Supp. 2008). In addition, trial courts must be mindful of
the primary purposes of alimony: "(1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same standard of
living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of each party; and (3) to
prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d
942, 943 (Utah 2008). Where a trial court considers these factors, we will disturb its alimony award
only if there is '"a serious inequity... manifesting] a clear abuse of discretion.'" Kelley v. Kelley, 2000
UT App 236,126, 9 P.3d 171 (quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct.App.1998)
Issue preserved in the record: the issue was preserved in the record in Transcript volume I
p. 17-18; volume p. 45-46.
2. Did the trial court err in imputing full-time income to Jeffery Fish, considering he was
engaged in career or occupational training, and fail to support it with specific, detailed findings
of fact?
Standard of Review. Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining the financial
interests of divorced parties. Allredv. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.1990). Although "the
trial court's 'actions are entitled to a presumption of validity,'" id.(quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736
P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)), appellate courts cannot
affirm its determination when the trial court abuses its discretion. Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d at 1111
(Utah App.1990). The trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings
supporting its financial determinations. See id. Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently
-2-
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detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached." Id. (Quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah
App.1988)). See also Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.1992) (detailed findings are
necessary to determine whether trial court has exercised its discretion in a rational manner).
Issue preserved in the record. The issue was preserved in the record in Transcript volume
I p. 197-200; volume Up. 6; volume II p. 15-32; volume III p. 53-56.
3. Did the trial court err in establishing alimony by failing to consider the parties' historical
income and standard of living?
Standard of Review. An appellate court reviews a trial court's determination of alimony
for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). A district court has broad
discretion when deciding alimony awards. Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983). In
addition to the Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) factors, a trial court shall consider
the primary aims of alimony when establishing an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to
the same standard of living that existed during the marriage, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c)
(Supp.2007); (2) to equalize the standards of living of each party, see id. § 30-3-5(8)(d); and (3) to
prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge, English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411
(Utah 1977).
Issue preserved in the record. The issue was preserved in the record at Transcript volume
III p. 47.
4. Did the trial court err in imputing $30,000 to $40,000 annual income to Jeffery Fish and
fail to support it with specific, detailed findings of fact?

-3-
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Standard of Review. An appellate court will not disturb the trial court's award of spousal
support absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96,
100 (Utah 1986). However, [t]he findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree
"follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah
1986). The findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). See also Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank,673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)
(findings of fact must clearly indicate the mind of the court).
Issue preserved in record. The issue was preserved in the record in Transcript volume III
p. 48-52.

-4-
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes are of central importance to the appeal:
1. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)-(d)
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii)

the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

(iii)

the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv)

the length of the marriage;

(v)

whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children
requiring support;

(vi)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and

(vii)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the
marriage.

(b) The court consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on
the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial
proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the
evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found in the
statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater
income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding
shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the
condition is not of a temporary nature:
(i)

the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;

(ii)

a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;

(iii)

a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic
job skills; or

(iv)

unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial
parent's presence in the home.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case. This is a domestic relations case in which Diane Fish filed for divorce
against Jeffery J. Fish on October 30, 2007. The Pre-Trial Order certified for trial the issue of
whether Diane Fish should receive alimony and, if so, the amount. Incorporated in Diane Fish's
claim for alimony was that Jeffery Fish was capable of employment. Also, certified for trial was
Diane Fish's claim for one-half QA) of Jeffery Fish's military retirement with the provision she was
not entitled to any of his disability pay.
Course of the proceedings. Diane Fish filed a Complaint for Divorce on October 30,
2007 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. On November 19, 2007, Jeffery Fish filed an
Answer. Pursuant to stipulation, Jeffery Fish filed an amended Answer and Counter Claim through
counsel. On January 31, 2008, Diane Fish's Motion for Temporary Orders was heard before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner. The parties agreed each would be paid $10,000 from the sale of
their marital residence. Approximately $83,000 was held in Petitioner's attorney trust account from
sale of their marital home. During the pendency of the proceedings, prior to trial, Diane Fish was not
awarded temporary alimony nor division of the military retirement. A non-jury trial was held on
April 27, 28, and 30, 2009 before District Court Judge, Ernie W. Jones.
The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 16, 2009. The trial court affirmed the
parties' stipulation Diane Fish was to receive approximately $633 per month as her one-half QA) of
Jeffery Fish's military retirement acquired during the marriage; that Jeffery Fish was to receive $421
per month VA Disability and $649 per month as his share of the military retirement.
The trial court found Jeffery Fish was underemployed at the time of trial. The Court
determined he was capable of full-time employment and imputed $30,000 to $40,000 annual income
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to him. The trial court found Diane Fish's monthly gross income in 2009 was about $2,000 per
month and her monthly net pay in 2008 was $ 1,628.
The trial determined Jeffery Fish's monthly living expenses to be $2,374 and Diane Fish's
monthly living expenses to be about $3,000. The trial court found the parties' 2002 through 2008 tax
returns to be relevant in establishing income potential for both parties. The Court found Diane Fish
had a need for alimony based on her income and expenses and that Jeffery Fish had an ability to pay
and ordered $800 per month alimony for a period of 27 years. Each party was ordered to pay their
own attorney fees as both were found at fault for the divorce and each had the ability to pay their own
attorney fees.
Jeffery Fish timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 27, 2009.

-8-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Diane Fish and Jeffery Fish were married on September 5, 1980. Transcript volume 1 p.
126. The parties' separated in October, 2007 and Diane Fish filed for divorce on October 30, 2007.
(Record at p. 0001)
2. Diane was 48 years old at the time of trial and had attended technical college after high
school. Transcript volume 1 p. 127
3. Diane studied medical assisting at the technical college. Transcript volume 1 p. 128
4. Diane works for Dr. Robert Capener, DDS as the office manager. The office consists of
two (2) dentists and five (5) hygienists. Transcript volume 1 p. 158-159. She schedules all of the
appointments and prepares the payroll. Transcript volume 1 p. 158
5. There is also employed three (3) other front staff people and other part-time assistants.
Diane has worked there 14 to 15 years. Transcript volume 1 p. 159
6. Diane works Monday through Thursday from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., although she does
work some Fridays. Transcript volume 1 p. 158
7. Diane Fish earns $15 per hour and had earned that for three (3) or four (4) years.
Transcript volume 1 p. 160
8. Diane testified she was prepared to seek other employment in order to have medical
insurance after the divorce. Transcript volume 1 p. 160
9. Diane testified it was not unreasonable to say she was able to work 40 hours per week.
Transcript volume 1 p. 161
10. Diane also acknowledged it was the norm in this day and age to work 40 hours per week.
Transcript volume 1 p. 161
-9-
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11. Diane worked part-time throughout the marriage, working around Jeffery's military
schedule and their children. Transcript volume 1 p. 161
12. Diane had considered relocating to Las Vegas, Nevada, near her daughter, and also looked
into a position in Florida as well. Transcript volume 1 p. 162
13. Diane acknowledged she was looking around for other employment as she had to be able
to take care of herself. Transcript volume 1 p. 162
14. Diane admitted she was looking for a 40-hour per week job. Transcript volume 1 p. 162
15. Diane claimed monthly living expenses of approximately $3,600 per month. Petitioner's
Exhibit 6
16. Diane claimed entertainment expenses of $300 per month, $200 per month travel
expenses, $300 per month for miscellaneous expenses, $50 per month for counseling, and $552 per
month for automobile expenses in addition to her car payment of $280 per month. Petitioner's
Exhibit 6
17. The trial court found Diane's monthly expenses to be about $3,000 a month. Findings of
Fact 32
18. Jeffery Fish claimed monthly living expenses of $2,374 per month. Respondent's
Exhibit 1
19. The trial court found Jeffery's monthly living expenses to be $2,374 as claimed. Findings
of Fact 28
20. Jeffery Fish testified he joined the United State Air Force on June 5, 1980 and retired on
August 1, 2000. Transcript volume 1 p. 96

-10-
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21. Jeffery's monthly military retirement pay is $1,703 gross and $1,477 net monthly pay,
after taxes and life insurance. Respondent's Exhibit 1 p. 8
22. The trial court found Diane was entitled to $633 per month gross pay and Jeffery $649 per
month gross pay, pursuant to the woodward formula in dividing the military retirement as per
stipulation of the parties, with Jeffery also receiving $421 per month disability pay. Findings of Fact
9, 10, and 11
23. Diane testified, after Jeffery retired in 2000, his work was off-and-on jobs, nothing
stable and that he really did not work a great deal after he retired from the military. Transcript
volume 1 p. 128, 129, and 175
24. In 2002, Jeffery earned $45,085 as a logistics specialist at Karta Technologies.
Petitioner's Exhibit 16, W-2
25. In 2003, Jeffery earned $18,889 at Karta Technologies. Petitioner's Exhibit 17, W-2.
Jeffery was terminated at Karta in 2003 for unacceptable performance. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 p. 5
26. In 2004 and 2005, Jeffery had no earnings as he sold auto parts on E-bay and lost money.
Respondent's Exhibit 3, p. 3 and Transcript volume 1 p. 128, 129
27. In 2006, Jeffery earned $20,545 at Fair Air Aviation as an aircraft mechanic. Petitioner's
Exhibit 20 and Respondent's Exhibit 3, p. 3
28. In 2007, Jeffery earned $25,710 as an aircraft mechanic at Fair Air Aviation. Petitioner's
Exhibit 37
29. In 2008, Jeffery had no earnings as he was attending school at Ogden Weber ATC and was
paid $671 per month by the Department of Veteran Affairs for vocational rehabilitation.
Exhibit 1, p. 2 and Transcript volume 1 p. 198
-11-
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Petitioner's

30. In 2009, Jeffery was still attending Ogden-Weber ATC, receiving $671 per month for
vocational rehabilitation, having started school in September, 2008 and anticipated graduating in
January, 2010. Transcript volume 1 p. 198
31. Diane Fish earned $17,529 in 2002; $18,561 in 2003; $25,582 in 2004; $27,000 in 2005;
$26,186 in 2006; $25,710 in 2007; and $25, 862 in 2008. Petitioner's Exhibits 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 37
and 30
32. Jeffery testified in 2008 he felt like he could be no longer be an aircraft mechanic and
applied for vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume 1 p. 197
33. Jeffery completed a Functional Capacity Evaluation in 2008, at Wasatch Physical Therapy,
Inc., which determined his physical ability did not match the requirements of remaining an aircraft
mechanic as he could not often carry heavy equipment weighing over 70 pounds, engage in repetitive
bending and twisting to work on aircraft, and stand for eight (8) hour shifts. Respondent's Exhibit 6,
p. 3
34. The United States Department of Labor 2008-09 Occupational Outlook Handbook for
Aircraft Mechanics states aircraft mechanics must lift or pull objects weighing more than 70 pounds,
often stand, lie, or kneel in awkward positions, and occasionally must work in precarious positions
such as on a ladder or scaffold, usually work 40 hours a week for eight (8) hour shifts, and that agility
is important for the reaching and climbing necessary to do the job. Respondent's Exhibit 8, p. 2-3
35. Ernest Chavez, therapist for Wasatch Physical Therapy, who completed the Functional
Capacity Evaluation, testified Jeffery also had an abnormal foot condition known as plantar fasciitis,
which causes pain in the feet if you stand on cement for long periods of time. Transcript volume lip.
11-12
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36. Martin Peterson, Jeffery's supervisor at Fair Air Aviation, testified Jeffery would pull off
his shoes and rub his feet before the shift was over, complaining of sore feet and said his feet hurt him
badly and he had a hard time getting through the day. Transcript volume lip. 58-59
37. Jeffery was retired from the Air Force with a 10% disability for lumbar sacral strain.
Transcript volume II p. 9, volume III p. 10
38. Martin Peterson testified, aircraft mechanics have to lift and pull objects weighing more
than 70 pounds, stand and kneel in awkward positions, pull or push airplanes the distance of a hangar
about 400 feet, and work under the instrument panel and tail section of the airplane. Transcript
volume lip. 59-61
39. Kristy Farnsworth, a vocational specialist, was called by Diane Fish regarding jobs in Utah
and wages. Transcript volume 1 p. 38
40. Kristy Farnsworth's vocational report was dated August 11, 2008, approximately one (1)
month before Jeffery started school for vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume 1, p. 54
41. Kristy Farnsworth testified Jeffery could find employment as an aircraft mechanic, a sales
representative, or a logistics specialist. Transcript volume 1 p. 43. She did not agree with the
conclusion of Ernest Chavez of Wasatch Physical Therapy, Inc. that Jeffery could not be an aircraft
mechanic. Transcript volume 1 p. 58
42. Kristy Farnsworth relied on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for a job analysis of
aircraft mechanics. Transcript volume 1 p. 60. That job analysis is found in Section 1 of her report.
Petitioner's Exhibit 1
43. Kristy Farnsworth testified that the job analysis contained in Jeffery Fish's Exhibit 8 for
Aircraft and Avionics Equipment Mechanics and Service Technicians is a different occupation from
that of an airframe and power plant mechanic referred to in Section 1 of her report found in
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Petitioner's Exhibit 1 and Transcript volume 1 p. 67, 68,
44. Jeffery Fish's Exhibit 8, from the United States Department of Labor for Aircraft
Mechanics states, on pages 1, 2 of Exhibit 8, that aircraft mechanics are also called airframe
mechanics, power plant mechanics, and avionics technicians. Most mechanics working on civilian
aircraft are A&P mechanics.
45. Martin Peterson testified there is no distinction between aircraft mechanics and A & P
mechanics and that Jeffery Fish was a licensed A & P mechanic. Transcript volume Up. 57-58
46. Kristy Farnsworth testified that aircraft mechanics must only lift or pull 50 pounds, not 70
pounds. Transcript volume I p. 61, Section 1 of Petitioner's Exhibit 1
47. Kristy Farnsworth testified the "M" in Section 1 of Petitioner's Exhibit stands for 50
pounds, not 70 pounds. Transcript volume I p. 61
48. Kristy Farnsworth, in her report, relied on Section 1 to describe the job description of an
aircraft mechanic, which was written in 1996 and has not been updated since, compared to Jeffery
Fish's Exhibit 8, prepared for the 2008-09 time frame.
49. Kristy Farnsworth, in her report, Petitioner's Exhibit 7, does not address the issue of
repetitive bending, kneeling, awkward positions or plantar fasciitis suffered by Jeffery. Petitioner's
Exhibit 1
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court has a statutory duty to consider the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income in determining alimony. Diane Fish is underemployed, which the trial court failed to
address. Diane Fish earns $15 per hour working Monday through Thursday from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30
p.m., although she testified she works some Fridays. She is the office manager for a dental office that
has two (2) dentists, five (5) hygienists, and several part-time employees. She has worked at that
office for 14 to 15 years.
She admitted at trial it was not unreasonable to impute 40 hours a week employment to her.
She further admitted she was looking for a 40-hour per week job. She testified she was prepared to
seek other employment in order to have medical insurance after the divorce. She acknowledged it
was the norm to work 40 hours per week.
If Diane Fish worked 40 hours per week at $15 per hour, she would gross $2,600 per month
and net $2,080. Adding to her monthly net pay of $2,080 her share of the military retirement of $633
per month would yield a total net monthly pay of $2,713. Her need for alimony would be $287 per
month to meet her monthly financial needs of $3,000, not $800 per month.
The trial court imputed full-time employment to Jeffery Fish even though he was engaged in
career or occupational training, attending Ogden-Weber ATC full-time in computer technology. In
effect, the trial court mandated that Jeffery quit school and become employed full-time, earning
$30,000 to $40,000 per annum in order to pay Diane Fish $800 per month.
Jeffery Fish completed a Functional Capacity Evaluation with a physical therapist, which
determined he did not have the physical capabilities to continue to work as an aircraft mechanic.
Jeffery Fish's work history in the military and civilian workforce was primarily as an aircraft
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mechanic. Based upon the Functional Capacity Evaluation, Jeffery could not continue as an aircraft
mechanic and qualified for vocational rehabilitation with the Department of Veteran Affairs,
receiving $671 per month to attend Ogden-Weber ATC full-time for an estimated 17 month course in
computer technology.
It was error to mandate Jeffery quit school in the middle of his vocational rehabilitation
training and impute full-time employment to him. Income may not be imputed to Jeffery if Diane was
asking the Court to impute income to Jeffery for child support and alimony purposes, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(d). This statute states income may not be imputed to a parent if the
parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills and the condition is
not of a temporary nature. It is unreasonable to impute income to Jeffery at this time, for alimony
purposes, when, if Jeffery had an obligation to support a minor child, income could not be imputed to
him if he was engaged in career or occupational training.
The trial court failed to follow its statutory duty to get the parties as close as possible to the
same standard of living that existed during the marriage and to equalize the standards of living of
each party, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) and (d). The parties maintained a modest
family income and standard of living during the marriage. Ordinarily, the standard of living shall be
established at the time of separation which, in this case was October, 2007. However, Diane Fish did
not put on evidence at trial as to the parties' standard of living at the time of separation. She did not
testify to the parties' past mortgage, utilities, or food at separation. She testified as to her present
rent, utilities, food and auto expenses in April, 2009, at the time of trial.
The trial court found Diane's monthly living expenses were $3,000 per month and Jeffery's
were $2,374 per month. The parties' historical income does not justify a present standard of living of
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$5,374 per month compared to their actual standard of living during the marriage. Diane testified
Jeffery really did not work a great deal after he retired in 2000 from the military and his employment
was not stable.
Jeffery earned $45,085 in 2002; $18,889 in 2003; none in 2004; none in 2005; $20,545 in
2006 as an aircraft mechanic; $25,710 in 2007 as an aircraft mechanic; none in 2008 and none in
2009.
Diane earned $17,529 in 2002; $18,561 in 2003; $25,582 in 2004; $27,060 in 2005; $26,186
in 2006; $25,710 in 2007 and $25,862 in 2008.
Based upon the parties' historical monthly gross earnings, their monthly net pay would not
justify a standard of living of $5,374 per month as determined by the trial court. The parties'
historical net monthly pay would establish a monthly standard of living of approximately $2,000 to
$2,300 per month to each.
The trial court erred in imputing $30,000 to $40,000 per annum income to Jeffery Fish
without supporting the imputation of earning ability by detailed, specific findings of fact. The trial
court does not specify what occupation Jeffery may follow to earn this salary or such jobs were
available in the present economy.
The Functional Capacity Evaluation indicates Jeffery does not have the physical ability to
continue as aircraft mechanic. Jeffery has no experience as a sales representative, which would not
support the contention he could earn, as a salesman, $28,000 to $53,000 per annum in today's
economy. The imputation of this wage is speculative and not substantiated. Jeffery was terminated at
Karta Technologies as a logistics specialist for unacceptable performance. The employment at Karta
is not a benchmark to establish his ability to earn a living as a logistics specialist. A logistics
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specialist is really a technical writer which, according to Kristy Famsworth's report, requires a
bachelor's degree. The trial court failed to make detailed, specific findings of fact, justifying its
conclusion that Jeffery can earn $30,000 to $40,000 per annum.
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ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO IMPUTE FULL-TIME
EMPLOYMENT TO APPELLEE, DIANE FISH
Counsel for Appellant, Jeffery Fish, requested the trial court impute full-time wages to
Appellee, Diane Fish, of $2,600 per month ($15 per hour, 40 hours per week). (R at volume IIIp. 46).
It was argued Diane Fish is underemployed. Diane Fish testified she earns $15 per hour as the office
manager for Dr. Robert Capener, DDS. Transcript volume I p. 160. If Diane Fish worked 40 hours
per week earning $15 per hour, she would gross $2,600 per month and receive a net monthly pay of
$2,080 per month. Transcript volume III p. 45, 46. It was argued Diane Fish has the ability to earn
$2,080 per month net pay by simply working 40 hours per week. Transcript volume III p. 46.
Counsel for Jeffery Fish, in his opening statement, made this argument as well as at the conclusion of
the trial. (Rat volume Ip. 17, 18).
The trial court, in Findings of Fact 29, found Diane Fish earned about $25,000 in gross wages
in 2008. In Findings of Fact 30, the trial court found her net monthly income for 2008 was $1,628.
The trial court did not make any findings of fact as to her net monthly income in 2009. However, the
trial court found her average gross monthly income for January through April, 2009 was $2,000 per
month.
If the trial court imputed $2,080 per month net income to Diane Fish from full-time
employment and added $633 per month as her share of the military retirement, her total net monthly
income would be $2,713. In Findings of Fact 32, the trial court found Diane Fish's monthly expenses
to be $3,000 per month. Accordingly, Diane Fish's need for alimony would be $287 per month if she
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would only work 40 hours per week. Diane Fish's underemployment should not be condoned by the
Court and imputation of full-time wages to her is appropriate. Diane Fish admitted it was not
unreasonable to say she was able to work 40 hours a week. (R at volume I p. 161). She further
admitted it was the norm to work 40 hours per week. (R at volume Ip. 161). Diane Fish has been
employed by Dr. Capener for 14 to 15 years. (R at volume Ip. 159). She schedules all the
appointments for the office. (R at volume Ip. 158). She prepares all the payroll. (R at volume I p.
158-159). The office has two (2) dentists and five (5) hygienists and several part-time employees. (R
at volume Ip. 159).
Diane Fish testified she was looking for a 40-hour per week job. (R at volume I p. 162). She
considered relocating to Las Vegas to be near her daughter and she had also looked into a position in
Florida as well. (R at volume Ip. 162). She admitted she was looking around to see what is out there
as she has to be able to take care of herself. (R at volume Ip. 162).
Diane Fish also admitted Dr. Capener was bringing on a new associate, Dr. Tom Matthews.
Transcript volume Ip. 159. She was hopeful Dr. Matthews would be employed full-time. Transcript
volume I p. 159.
Diane Fish testified she was prepared to look for other work if she had to obtain medical
insurance. Transcript volume I p. 160. She has a high school degree and technical college training.
Transcript volume I p. 127. Diane Fish did not testify to any health concerns preventing her from
full-time work.
The trial court has a statutory duty to consider the ability of the receiving spouse to produce
sufficient income for herself. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) provides:
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(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii)

the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

(iii)

the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv)

the length of the marriage;

(v)

whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children
requiring support;

(vi)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and

(vii)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the
marriage.

Numerous Utah cases also hold, in determining alimony, the Court must make adequate
findings and conclusions, demonstrating it has considered three (3) factors: (1) the financial condition
and needs of the party seeking alimony; (2) that party's ability to produce a sufficient income; and (3)
the ability of the other party to provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988);
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App.1992); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075
(Utah 1985).
The trial court abused its discretion in not imputing Diane Fish's income at $2,600 per month
gross wage, $2,080 per month net pay, based upon full-time employment at her present salary. In
Thronson v. Thronson the trial court imputed full-time wages to Ms. Thronson, assuming she was
employed on a full-time basis. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App.1991)
In Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 554 (Utah App.1993), the trial court imputed income to
Mrs. Willey based upon a projection of full-time work at her present salary. The Utah Court of
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Appeals held, "we do not question the trial court's authority to impute income to Mrs. Willey.
Imputing income to an unemployed or underemployed spouse when getting an alimony award is
conceptually appropriate as part of that spouse's ability to produce a sufficient income."
In this case, even though Diane Fish admitted it was not unreasonable to impute 40 hours per
week employment to her and that she was looking for a 40-hour per week job, the trial court did not
impute full-time wages to her. The trial court made no findings of fact why it is inappropriate to
impute full-time employment to her. Failure to consider the factors enumerated in Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a), constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, the trial court must make
sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon these factors. The trial court failed to
make any findings of fact why Diane Fish should not have full-time employment at $15 per hour
imputed to her. Considering the facts of this case, Diane Fish should have full-time wages imputed to
her and it was error not to do so.
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II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING FULL-TIME
INCOME TO JEFFERY FISH, CONSIDERING HE WAS ENGAGED
IN CAREER OR OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING AND FAILED
TO SUPPORT IT WITH SPECIFIC, DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT
The trial court found Jeffery Fish was capable of working full-time and imputed an income in
a sum of between $30,000 to $40,000 annually to him. Findings of Fact 26. The trial court found
Jeffery Fish to be underemployed at the time of trial. Findings of Fact 27.
Jeffery Fish did not stipulate that income may be imputed to him. Jeffery presented evidence
to the Court of his historical earnings since his retirement from the military in 2000 and that he was
engaged in vocational rehabilitation through the Department of Veteran Affairs. Jeffery Fish testified
he felt he could not be an aircraft mechanic anymore and, after testing, the Department of Veteran
Affairs accepted him for the vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume I p. 197
Jeffery was attending the Ogden-Weber Applied Technology Center at the time of trial.
Transcript volume I p. 198. He started attending Ogden-Weber ATC full-time in September, 2008
and was on track to graduate in January, 2010. Transcript volume I p. 198. Jeffery was being trained
to be a computer technician, to install software and hardware devices. Transcript volume I p. 199.
He was going to school full-time. Transcript volume I p. 199. Jeffery received the sum of $671.13
per month to attend Ogden-Weber ATC for vocational rehabilitation. Transcript volume I p. 215
Jeffery has a history of back pain. Respondent's Exhibit 5. He takes Flexeril for back pain.
Transcript volume I p. 204-205. Before Jeffery could qualify for vocational rehabilitation, he was
required to obtain a functional evaluation of his back. Transcript volume I p. 206. Dr. Troy
Schwartz, medical doctor at Hill AFB, Utah, requested he obtain a functional evaluation of his back
and feet. Transcript volume I p. 206
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Jeffery completed a two (2) day Functional Capacity Evaluation on January 8 and 9, 2008 at
Wasatch Physical Therapy, Inc. Respondent's Exhibit 6. The last page of Respondent's Exhibit 6
indicates Jeffery was referred to Wasatch Physical Therapy as he suffered from chronic back and foot
pain and needed an evaluation regarding his ability to work as an aircraft mechanic. Respondent's
Exhibit 6. Jeffery's complaint to Wasatch Physical Therapy was that of lower back pain from
working in awkward positions and repetitive bending, lifting, and twisting as an aircraft mechanic as
well as chronic foot pain from standing on cement floors for extended periods of time. Respondent's
Exhibit 6, p. 9. Jeffery was retired from the Air Force with a 10% disability for lumbar sacral strain
(R at volume Up. 9).
The results of the Functional Capacity Evaluation revealed the physical requirements of his
job as an aircraft mechanic did not meet his physical abilities to be an aircraft mechanic.
Respondent's Exhibit 6, p. 2. Jeffery could not lift and carry heavy equipment weighing over 70
pounds nor engage in repetitive bending and twisting to work on aircraft, nor stand for eight (8) hour
shifts. Respondent's Exhibit 6, p. 2
Ernest Chavez, physical therapist at Wasatch Physical Therapy, testified at the trial. His focus
in testing the physical capabilities of Jeffery was to test Jeffery to see if he could continue to be an
aircraft mechanic. Transcript volume Up. 6. In testing Jeffery, Mr. Chavez documented Jeffery
suffered from a condition known as plantar fasciitis, a tenderness of the plantar fascia on the bottom
of the foot.

TranscriptvolumeIIp.il

Ernest Chavez testified that Jeffery Fish's physical capabilities did not match the job
description of an aircraft mechanic. Transcript volume lip. 15. He recommended job modifications
or alternative placement. Transcript volume Up. 15. As for a job modification, he recommended that
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Jeffery could not lift anything over 70, 80 pounds, not be standing on his feet, and try not to be in
awkward positions, which can cause more back strain and pain. Transcript volume Up. 16.
Martin Peterson, an aircraft mechanic and shop foreman at Fair Air Aviation, testified he was
Jeffery Fish's supervisor when Jeffery Fish worked at Fair Air Aviation. Transcript volume lip. 5658. Jeffery was employed there in 2006 to about September, 2007. Transcript volume Up. 58. He
recalls Jeffery complaining of sore feet, they hurt him badly, and Jeffery had a hard time getting
through the day. Transcript volume Up. 59. He described aircraft mechanics as being required to
push and pull aircraft for a distance of 400 feet, lift four (4) 60 pound sand bags to stabilize the tail of
the aircraft, work underneath the instrument panel, and crawl in the tail section. Transcript volume II
p. 59-61. He described , at the end of the day, "I'm tired." (R at volume lip. 62)
After completing the Functional Capacity Evaluation on January 9, 2008, Jeffery applied for
vocational rehabilitation on March 13, 2008. Transcript volume I p. 207. He was accepted and
qualified for vocational rehabilitation by the Department of Veteran Affairs. Transcript volume I p.
197
If, in this case, Diane Fish was asking the Court to impute income to Jeffery for child support
and alimony purposes, Diane Fish would have to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-12-203(7)(d). Diane would have to prove Jeffery was not engaged in career or occupational
training to establish basic job skills. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203 (7)(d) states:
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the
condition is not of a temporary nature:
(i)

the reasonable costs of child care for the parents'minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;

(ii)

a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;
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(iii)

a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic
job skills; or

(iv)

unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial
parent's presence in the home.

It is not unreasonable to also require, when a party is asking the Court to impute income for
alimony purposes only, as in this case, that the same requirements be met as when one asks the Court
to impute income to a spouse for child support and alimony purposes.
In Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App.1993) the husband challenged the trial court's ruling
regarding his child support and alimony obligations. He specifically argued, in determining the
amount of income to be imputed to him, the trial court failed to follow statutory directives in
assessing his employment potential and probable earnings as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12203(7)(b).
In this case, the trial court should not impute income to Jeffery Fish without considering that
income may not be imputed if one is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job
skills not of a temporary nature.
InMancilv. Smith, 18P.3d509, 512 (Utah App.2000) the Utah Court of Appeals held that
§ 78B-12-203 (7)(d)(iii) applies only to short-term job training that is a condition of employment at a
fairly fundamental level.
It is not necessary in this case that we definitively state what kind of training
would qualify: Would a year of vocational school training in welding? An 18month course to obtain a paralegal's certificate? A two-year program at a
community college culminating an associate's degree in bookkeeping? We
can, however, say that obtaining a bachelor's degree affords employment at a
level so far beyond "basic" that, as a matter of law, it does not satisfy the
statute.
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In this case, Jeffery was attending Ogden-Weber Applied Technology Center from September,
2008 and was scheduled to graduate in January. 2010, approximately a 17 month course of study.
The Department of Veteran Affairs was paying Jeffery $671.13 per month to retrain Jeffery in
computer technology. He was going to school full-time, engaged in vocational rehabilitation.
The same argument should apply to imputing income to Jeffery Fish for alimony purposes as
applies to establishing income for child support and alimony purposes. Jeffery's qualifications for
vocational rehabilitation with the Department of Veteran Affairs is clear evidence that the Functional
Capacity Evaluation completed by Wasatch Physical Therapy was accepted by the United States
government and that Jeffery qualified for vocational rehabilitation as he was not suited to be an
aircraft mechanic.
It is error for the Court to impute an income to Jeffery at this time. The trial court stated, at
the conclusion of the case that, "What I am being asked to do is somehow find a way to give Mr. Fish
more money and I have got to decide that Mr. Fish has got to go to work and pay alimony or I've got
to decide that he is unable to do that, based on his physical ability and ability to earn income."
Transcript volume III p. 64. In this case, Jeffery's imputed income should be established after he
completes his training, consistent with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78B12-203(7)(d)(iii).
The trial court made no specific findings of fact that Jeffery was not engaged in career or
occupational training. The trial court received evidence Jeffery was being paid by the Department of
Veteran Affairs to attend a 17 month course at the Ogden-Weber ATC. The trial court does not reveal
its analysis of Jeffery's attendance at school on his ability to pay alimony or have income imputed to
him at the time of trial.
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Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ESTABLISHING
ALIMONY BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PARTIES'
HISTORICAL INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING
The trial court erred in awarding alimony of $800 per month to Diane Fish, considering the
parties' standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. The trial court's award of alimony creates a
serious inequity manifesting a clear abuse of discretion.
In assessing alimony, trial courts have appropriately relied on historical income rather than
income at the time of the divorce where a party has experienced a temporary decrease in income.
Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); Cox v. Cox, %11 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App.1994);
and Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Utah 1977). Trial courts have also relied on
historical income where a spouse experiences unusual prosperity during one (1) year. English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977).
In this case, the parties have maintained a very modest standard of living with modest
incomes. In 2003, Jeffery earned $18,889 as a logistics specialist in addition to his military
retirement. Petitioner's Exhibit 17, W-2. Diane earned $19,160 that year. Petitioner's Exhibit 17,
W-2. The total family monthly net pay would be approximately $ 1,214 for Diane and $ 1,200 net pay
for Jeffery, plus approximately $ 1,477 per month military pay for a total monthly net pay of $3,891.
This figure is well below the monthly living expenses the trial court determined for the parties at trial
of $5,374 ($3,000 plus $2,374).
In 2004, Jeffery had no income as he worked as a salesman selling parts on E-bay.
Petitioner's Exhibit 18 and Respondent's Exhibit 3. Jeffery's only source of income was his military
retirement of approximately $1,477 per month net pay. Diane earned $25,582 in 2004 with
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approximately $ 1,620 net pay per month. The parties had a monthly net combined pay of $3,097.
In 2005, Jeffery had no monthly income except his military retirement as he worked as a
salesman selling parts on E-bay in 2005. Petitioner's Exhibit 19. Diane earned $27,060 in 2005 and
would have earned approximately $1,714 per month net pay. The parties would have a combined
monthly net pay of $3,191 in 2005.
In 2006, Jeffery earned $20,545 at Fair Air Aviation as an aircraft mechanic plus his military
retired pay. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 and Respondent's Exhibit 3. Diane earned $26,186 in 2006.
Petitioner's Exhibit 20. Their combined monthly net pay would have been approximately $4,436.
In 2007, Jeffery earned $25,710 as a mechanic at Fair Air Aviation plus his military
retirement. Petitioner's Exhibit 32. Diane earned $24,582 in 2007. Petitioner's Exhibit 32. Their
combined monthly net pay would be approximately $4,663.
In 2008, Jeffery earned $671 per month vocational rehabilitation pay plus his military
retirement pay. Petitioner's Exhibit 30. Diane earned $25,862 in 2008. Petitioner's Exhibit 30.
Their combined monthly net pay in 2008 would have been approximately $3,786.
In 2009, Jeffery was earning $671 per month vocational rehabilitation pay plus his military
retirement. Respondent's Exhibit 1. Diane was earning $2,027 per month gross wage and monthly
net pay of $ 1,545. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Their combined monthly net pay in 2009 would have been
$3,693.
The parties' historical income and standard of living does not support a monthly alimony
award of $800. Diane would actually have greater income than Jeffery if she is credited with her
woodward share of the military retirement pay in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009. In 2003 and
2007, Jeffery's income was slightly higher that of Diane's. The parties' historical income and
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standard of living during the marriage is very modest and does not justify an award of $800 per month
alimony. The parties' standard of living should be approximately $2,000 to $2,300 per month to each
party based upon their past standard of living during the marriage. Their historical standard of living
does not support the findings of the trial court that Jeffery's monthly needs should be $2,374 per
month and Diane's monthly needs be $3,000 per month.
Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards so long as they consider at least
the following factors, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) (Supp.2009):
(i)

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii)

the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

(iii)

the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv)

the length of the marriage;

(v)

whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children
requiring support;

(vi)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and

(vii)

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the
marriage.

In addition, trial courts must be mindful of the primary purposes of alimony: "(I) to get the
parties as close as possible to the same standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to
equalize the standards of living of each party; and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a
public charge." Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008); Jensen v. Jensen, 197
P.3d 117, 120 (Utah App.2008).
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Also, trial courts must consider Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) (Supp.2009) in determining
the standard of living of the parties:
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living at
the time of trial.
It is necessary for the trial court to analyze the parties' standard of living that existed during
the marriage. The bench trial in this case occurred on April 27, 28, and 30, 2009. The parties
separated on or about October 15, 2007 and Diane Fish filed for divorce in this case on October 30,
2007. At trial, Diane Fish did not submit her monthly living expenses incurred at the time of
separation in October, 2007. Diane only submitted her monthly living expenses at the time of trial in
April, 2009. Petitioner's Exhibit 6. The parlies' historical income and standard of living during the
marriage do not support the standard of living determined by the trial court of $2,374 per month to
Jeffery and $3,000 per month to Diane, and support an award of $800 per month alimony. It was
error for the trial court to award $800 per month alimony.
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IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING $30,000 TO $40,000
ANNUAL INCOME TO JEFFERY FISH AND FAILED TO
SUPPORT IT WITH SPECIFIC, DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT
The trial court found Jeffery Fish was capable of working full-time and imputed an income to
him in a sum between $30,000 and $40,000 annually. Findings of Fact 33. However, the trial court
does not indicate what job Jeffery could have that pays him $30,000 to $40,000 per year.
Jeffery was an aircraft mechanic while he was enlisted in the United States Air Force.
Transcript volume Ip. 109. He retired after 20 years of military service in 2000. Transcript volume I
p. 96. His taxable income in 1999, the last full year he served in the military, was $29,383.
Respondent's Exhibit 3. After retiring from the military, Jeffery was employed as an aircraft
mechanic by Great Western Aviation. Transcript volume I p. 101. In 2001, he earned $31,930 as an
aircraft mechanic at Great Western. Respondent's Exhibit 3. He worked for Great Western for a little
over a year. (R at volume I, p. 101). In 2002, Jeffery worked the entire year at Karta Technologies
and earned $45,085 as a logistics specialist. Petitioner's Exhibit 16. Jeffery was terminated in May,
2003 because of unacceptable performance. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 4-5. Jeffery was employed at
Karta as a logistics specialist. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 4-5. He typed documentation related to
aircraft maintenance testing procedures into technical order format. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 4-5.
After being terminated by Karta in May, 2003, Jeffery sold auto parts on E-bay during 2004
and 2005, operating as Fish Enterprises. Petitioner's Exhibits 18 and 19. Jeffery reported no income
in 2004 and 2005, incurring business losses on his tax return for those years. Petitioner's Exhibits 18
and 19
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In 2006, Jeffery earned $20,545 as an aircraft mechanic for Fair Air Aviation. Respondent's
Exhibit 3. In 2007, Jeffery earned $25,710 as an aircraft mechanic for Fair Air. Respondent's
Exhibit 3. In 2008, Jeffery was approved for vocational rehabilitation and started attending OgdenWeber Applied Technology Center for computer training. He was paid $671 per month by the
Department of Veteran Affairs while attending school. Jeffery was still attending school at the time
of trial in April, 2009. Jeffery had not earned more than $25,000 per annum since 2002, a period of
seven (7) years before the trial.
Jeffery's occupation in the military, at Great Western Aviation, and at Fair Air Aviation was
an aircraft mechanic. Jeffery testified he felt he could no longer be an aircraft mechanic. (R at
volume I p. 197). Jeffery was referred to Wasatch Physical Therapy for a Functional Capacity
Evaluation to determine if he could physically perform as an aircraft mechanic. (R at volume 1, p.
206). Jeffery's goal was to regain employment in something that would not increase his pain.
Respondent's Exhibit 6, p. 9
The Functional Capacity Evaluation revealed Jeffery's physical abilities were not a job match
for an aircraft mechanic. Jeffery could not work for eight (8) hours a day, five (5) days a week, lift
and carry heavy equipment often weighing over 70 pounds, perform repetitive bending and twisting to
work on aircraft and stand for eight (8) hour shifts. Respondent's Exhibit 6, p.3
Ernest Chavez, therapist for Wasatch Physical Therapy, also documented Jeffery experienced
pain in his feet from a condition known as plantar fasciitis. (R at volume Up. 11). Plantar fasciitis is
a tenderness of the plantar fascia on the bottom of the foot. (R at volume Up. 11)
Ernest Chavez's recommendation was that Jeffery could work, but not as an aircraft mechanic.
(R at volume lip. 13). Jeffery could lift 70 pounds to 80 pounds up to three (3) times a day, but not
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more often during a work day. (R at volume Up. 14). Jeffery could not also perform repetitive
bending and twisting. (R at volume Up. 15). He also could not stand on cement floors for eight (8)
hours a day and increase pressure on his feet by carrying heavy objects. (R at volume lip. 15)
Kristy Farnsworth, vocational rehabilitation specialist, testified for Diane Fish that, based
upon Jeffery Fish's work experience, he would most likely be able to obtain employment as an
aircraft mechanic at a starting salary in the range of $43,070 up to $55,720. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p.
19. Her report states it appears that the abilities Mr. Fish demonstrated during the Functional
Capacity Evaluation are compatible with the physical demands of an aircraft mechanic. Petitioner's
Exhibit 1, p. 4. Her report indicated an aircraft mechanic is required to lift a maximum of 50 pounds,
citing the Department of Labor, and only occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch.
Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 3. She interpreted the designation "M" for strength on being 50 pounds.
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 Section 1. Kristy Farnsworth offered no independent medical evidence of
Jeffery's physical capabilities other than that presented by Wasatch Physical Therapy.
Kristy Farnsworth's report is contrary to the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational
Handbook, 2008-09. Respondent's Exhibit 8, 9, and 10. The Department of Labor Handbook for
Aircraft Mechanics actually states, "Mechanics usually work in hangars or in other outdoor areas.
Frequently mechanics must lift or pull objects weighing more than 70 pounds. They often stand, lie,
or kneel in awkward positions, and occasionally must work in precarious positions such as on
scaffolds or ladders...agility is important for the reaching and climbing necessary to do the job."
Respondent's Exhibit 8, p. 2
Kristy Farnsworth's analysis of the Functional Capacity Evaluation is incorrect. The
Functional Capacity Evaluation indicates Jeffery's physical abilities are not a match for an aircraft
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mechanic. Her conclusion that Jeffery is most likely to obtain employment as an aircraft mechanic is
not credible and it appears she has simply ignored the findings of the Functional Capacity Evaluation.
The trial court made no specific findings of whether Jeffery could be employed as an aircraft
mechanic.
Kristy Farasworth reports that Jeffery may obtain full-time employment as a sales
representative with a beginning salary of $28,330. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p.2. However, the current
advertised job openings with the Utah Department of Workforce Services listed the pay for sales
representatives was $10 to $11 per hour. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 11-16. Considering today's
economy and high unemployment rate, it is questionable that a good paying sales representative job is
available. Jeffery has no work experience as a sales representative. Kristy Farnsworth's report is
speculative as to Jeffery's ability to be successfully employed as a salesman.
Kristy Farnsworth also reported Jeffery's vocational option could also be full-time
employment with the Federal government as a logistics specialist. However, Jeffery was terminated
as a logistics specialist with Karta Technologies because of unacceptable performance. Jeffery has
not demonstrated a historical ability to be a logistics specialist. A logistics specialist is actually a
technical writer, which requires a bachelor's degree. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Section 2, p. 3.
In Findings of Fact 26, the trial court found Jeffery capable of working full-time and imputed
a wage of between $30,000 and $40,000 per year. The Court does not make a specific finding that
Jeffery is employable as an aircraft mechanic, as a sales representative, or as a logistics specialist.
Based upon the lack of specific findings, it is unknown what type of employment the trial court
actually found Jeffery could obtain. It was error for the trial court to impute $30,000 to $40,000 per
annum income to Jeffery without specific, detailed findings of fact to support the trial court's
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determination.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Diane Fish is underemployed and full-time wages should be imputed to her. Jeffery Fish was
engaged in career or occupational training and full-time employment should not be imputed to him
until he completes his training. The trial court failed to consider the parties' standard of living that
existed during the marriage and, instead, adopted an inflated standard of living. The trial court's
award of $800 per month alimony created a serious inequity, resulting in an abuse of discretion. The
trial court erroneously imputed $30,000 to $40,000 per annum income to Jeffery Fish. Jeffery Fish
lacks the physical capabilities to continue to be employed as an aircraft mechanic, he has never been
employed as a sales representative, and was terminated for unacceptable performance as a logistics
specialist, all of which refute the trial court's imputation of income to him. The trial court made no
specific, detailed findings of fact supportive of its imputation of income to Jeffery Fish and
designating what employment it found Jeffeiy Fish to be suited. The trial court's award of $800 per
month should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this

deiy of April 2010.
NEELEY&NEELEY

ROBERT L. NEELEY
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
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were served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to Timothy W. Blackburn, attorney for Petitioner
/Appellee, at the following address:
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372 24th Street, Suite 400
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ADDENDA
A.

Memorandum Decision

B.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

C.

Decree of Divorce
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